Constitutional law, MR L T Biti for the applicant. The applicant, a woman, enrolled for a 3 year teacher training course at a college run by a church. Before entering, she signed a contract in which it was agreed that she would be withdrawn from the course if she became pregnant. After she had been on the course nearly 2 years, she married a man according to customary law, and shorty afterwards became pregnant. The respondent, the principal of the college, required the applicant to withdraw from the college but recommended that the rejoin the next year’s course.

The applicant sought a declaration that the policy of expelling or suspending pregnant students was unconstitutional, in that it contravened s23(1) of the constitution and that she should be allowed to sit her examinations. The respondents argued that the college was a private institution, not a public authority, that the relationship between the parties was contractual and should be regarded asa a matter of personal law, and that the colleges right of freedom of association entitled it to exclude those persons who did not conform with its requirements.

held, that the college had sufficient “public” features to bring it within the definition of a public office of public authority. These features were that education is a public concern ain which the government plays a controlling and regulatory role; that the ministry of higher education regulated the colleges academic activities that the lecturers received their salaries from the state; and that the students enrolled at the college were sponsored by the state.

held, further that the conduct of the college was patently discriminatory. It was not saved by the requirement that a male student who caused the pregnancy of a female student should also withdraw from the college. A married male student would not be affected if his wife became pregnant, while a married female student who became pregnant would have to withdraw from the college. In addition, the reality was that it was mostly if not only pregnant female students who were visited with the penalty. The condition of pregnancy was a certain fat, while all that faced a male student was at best an allegation that he was responsible for a pregnancy an allegation he could deny

held further that the lack of child car facilities could not be used to justify the requirement for pregnant students to withdraw; rather, the lack of facilities was itself a form of discrimination

held further, that the principle of freedom of contract was outweighed by the principle of fairness. In any event, students did not in reality contract freely. they had no choice but to accept the terms of the contract. The contract did not preclude students from engaging in sexual activities and pregnancy could occur even if the most rigorous of contraceptive methods were used. It was unfair to punish the consequence of sexual activities and not the conduct that leads to it. The clause also did not distinguish between married and unmarried women, which was unfair and discriminatory even by religious standards.

• held, furthe4r that the enforcement of the discriminatory clause would be contrary to public policy in a count where concerted effort have been and continue to be made to eliminate discrimination on the grounds of sex or gender. Pregnancy in itself would not frustrate the primary purpose f the college which is to train teachers.

Mr Biti was an applicant in this matter with A P de Bourbon standing for him. — this was a    conditional law case — Parliament — Standing orders.The applicants applied to the Supreme Court in terms of s 24 of the constitution of a declaration that a bill, subsequently promulgated as an Act, had not been lawfully enacted by Parliament. The bill had been negatived at its third reading but too days later, on the motion of the minister responsible for he bill, Parliament resolved to suspend the standing order which prohibited the interdiction of the same bill twice in the same session and resolved to rescind its decision on the bills third reading, and this time it was passed by the House. The applicants a member of Parliament and his polecat part, complained that the manner in which the Bill was passed was unlawful and failed to afford them due process and protection of law

held, that s 18 of the constitution gartunees all persons, inside and outside parliament, the right to protection of the law, which includes the right to due process. the application was therefore properly before the supreme court in terms of s24 of the constitution.

held, further that parliament’s stated orders being made in terms of s 57 pop the constitution must be obeyed and followed. Parliament cannot suspend them for the expedience of a party. It is required to comply with its own laws regarding the enactment of legislation.

Held, that Standing Order 127, which prohibits the introduction in parliament of a bill which is substantially the same in binding in the Zimbabwean Parliament.

Held, further that Zimbabwe is a constitutional democracy in which it is for the court not Parliament to determine the lawfulness of actions of bodies, including Parliament the supreme court has not only the power but the duty to determine whether or not legislation has been enacted as required by the constitution Parliament can do only what is authorise by law— specifically the constitution

Mr LT Biti for the appellant – constitutional law protection against acquisition without    compensation. The appellant a public servant had been the subject of disciplinary proceedings. He had been discharged from the public service. His discharge was set aside by the Supreme Court and the matter remitted for hearing by a different magistrate. In terms of s 23 of the Public service Disciplinary regulations 1992, the regulations then in force, if a public servant had been suspend and then discharged and the discharge was set aside by a competent court, he would then revert to being suspended. Suspension would deprive him of his salary and benefits. The appellant sought an order for the high court setting aside his suspension and direction the respondent to pay him his full salary and benefits from the date of the discharge until the date on which the discharge was set aside. The high court refused the application but ordered that the misconduct hearing be held within 30 days.

On appeal, it was augured on his behalf that when the supreme court set aside the suspension it sectored the status quo ante, and he was entitled to his salary and benefits,and contravened s16(1) of the condition because it deprived him of his property without compensation.

held that the section did contravene s16 (1) of the constitution because it deprived him of his property without compensation and thus was no force or effect.

Mr L T Biti for the applicant – matter in the supreme court a constitutional application on s22 right to reside in zimbabwe.

• The applicant was a citizen of Zimbabwe. She had married a lebanese man. Before coming to Zimbabwe, he had been convicted of murder in lebanon and served a term of imprisonment before being released under an amnesty. He failed to declare this conviction on arrival in Zimbabwe. After his arrival he met and married the applicant; the immigration authorities on discovering his conviction, declared him a prohibited person and sought to have him removed. the applicant brought a constitutional application, arguing that her constitutional right to freedom of movement and residence would be impaired.
• held, that the interference with h applicants constitutional rights could be justified only on the grounds of public safety or public order. the removal of the applicants husband was manifestly aimed at ensuring the interests of the public safety and the public order in Zimbabwe. The interfere4nce was in line with he legitimate aims authored by the constitution
• held, further that in deciding whether the applicant had shown that such interference was not reasonably justified in a democratic society , the court had to weigh up the public interest in the removal of a person was, because of his past criminal record, was justifiably seen as a threat to the safety of persons and property against the certain disruption to the life of the applicant, who had to choose between going to a foreign country or remaining here without her husband. The balance was not tilted in favour of the applicant: her husband had committed a most abhorrent murder— one which if committed in Zimbabwe , would have attracted the death penalty — and had lied about it when he entered the countr. the state was within its rightist remove prohibited persons and that right could only be restricted in well-defined cases- the was not such a case.